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DELEGATION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF  
AMERICAN LIBERTIES: 






“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and 
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many . . . may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”1  This convic-
tion, penned by James Madison under the pseudonym of Publius, 
served to remind the delegates of the Constitutional Convention of 
the dangers that could arise from the government that was being cre-
ated.2  Among the numerous principles espoused by Madison, John 
Jay, and Alexander Hamilton in their pro-Federalist pamphlets, the 
theory of separation of powers in government was often alluded to as 
a necessary principle that would help preserve the freedom and liber-
ty secured by the Revolution.  Yet today, more than two centuries af-
ter these statesmen penned such ardent support for the document that 
is the foundation of American government, there still exists disa-
greement over the proper role and reach of the three branches,3 as 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2014, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. 2011 in Politi-
cal Science, College of the Holy Cross.  I would like to thank Professor Thomas Schweitzer 
for taking the time to discuss with me the finer aspects of religious freedom and the First 
Amendment and advice on the direction of this paper; Jonathan Vecchi and Meaghan How-
ard for their guidance, editing, and support; to my parents for providing me the opportunity 
to learn; and my family and friends for listening to me drone on about free exercise and del-
egation for a year.  In particular, I would like to extend extra thanks and appreciation to my 
parents for their continued support and for making my pursuit of higher education possible.   
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
2 Id. 
3 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (regarding the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive veto in regard to regulation creation by agencies); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 
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well as concern for the fate of certain liberties4 that Madison cared to 
keep from beneath the heel of tyrants. 
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act (“PPACA”)5 in an attempt to make health care more af-
fordable and easier to obtain for the majority of Americans without 
insurance.6  With such a monumental law, totaling over 900 pages, 
came the creation and addition of numerous regulatory policies,7 as 
well as several constitutional challenges to Congress’s authority to 
enact certain aspects of such a legislative behemoth, most notably in 
the recently decided National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius.8  Accompanying such sweeping legislation was the concern 
regarding the role of the federal government in the market, the home, 
the workplace, and even in religion. 
Part II of this Comment will address the effect of certain as-
pects of the PPACA on regulation, as well as the creation and sub-
stance of Title 45, Section 147.130 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions regarding coverage of preventative services.9  Part III will 
examine the history of Congressional delegation to the Executive 
branch throughout the twentieth century, as well as the history of the 
First Amendment and the evolution of free exercise claims through-
out that period.  The various tests established during the last century 
will be discussed for both topics.  Part IV will discuss current juris-
prudence in the realm of delegation and free exercise claims.  Part V 
will criticize the modern interpretation of Congressional delegation 
and endorse the modern approach to free exercise claims and will 
conclude with an argument that Title 45, Section 147.130 is unconsti-
tutional on the grounds of improper legislative delegation and viola-
 
524 U.S. 417 (1998) (regarding the extent of the executive power to veto and the constitu-
tionality of the Line Item Veto Act). 
4 The Supreme Court averaged approximately eight First Amendment cases a term be-
tween 2000 and 2010, excluding the 2007-2008 term, for which information was unavaila-
ble.  Supreme Court Cases, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/ 
supreme-court-cases (last visited May 19, 2013). 
5 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [hereinafter PPACA], Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
6 See Barack H. Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President to a Joint Session of 
Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9, 2009) (transcript available at www.whitehouse.gov/the_press 
_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-a-Joint-Session-of-Congress-on-Health-Care). 
7 See PPACA, supra note 5. 
8 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
9 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011). 
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tion of the Free Exercise Clause. 
II. THE PPACA AND THE HHS MANDATE 
The concepts that underlie the PPACA, though it would not 
assume that title until later, were first encouraged by President 
Obama during his remarks to a joint session of Congress in 2009.10  
In his speech to Congress regarding the state of health care in the na-
tion, President Obama explained the regular failure of each president 
of the preceding century to overhaul and reform the health care in-
dustry in America.11  President Obama made his intentions quite clear 
when he explained, “[o]ur collective failure to meet this challenge—
year after year, decade after decade—has led us to the breaking 
point . . . .  We are the only democracy—the only advanced democra-
cy on Earth—the only wealthy nation—that allows such hardship for 
millions of its people.”12 
The problems facing the American people were clear to the 
President.  These issues, that affected many Americans, included 
higher premium costs with less coverage, denial of insurance for pre-
existing conditions, and financial burdens placed on taxpayers in or-
der to support government programs such as Medicaid and Medicare, 
among others.13  In order to address these issues, the President illus-
trated the goals he hoped to achieve, as well as his plan to accomplish 
those goals.14  For those with health insurance, the President wanted 
to ensure that the plan would work better for the consumer, meaning 
that the insurance companies would not be able to drop subscribers 
who developed chronic illnesses, nor could companies deny one ser-
vice because of any “arbitrary cap.”15  For those without insurance, 
the plan would offer “quality, affordable choices” by way of a new 
insurance exchange.16  Lastly, the President wanted to hold the insur-
ance companies accountable and stem the rising price of health 
 




14 Id. (explaining that his plan will “provide more security and stability to those who have 
health insurance.  It will provide insurance for those who don’t.  And it will slow the growth 
of health care costs for our families, our business, and our government”). 
15 Obama, supra note 6. 
16 Id. 
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care.17 
In working with Congress to enact the PPACA, President 
Obama was able to, for the most part, achieve these goals.  For some, 
the PPACA was a blessing—it allowed them to obtain more afforda-
ble health care or, for some citizens with pre-existing conditions, it 
provided an opportunity for coverage which had not existed for dec-
ades.18  However, some provisions of the bill gave rise to regulations 
that reignited the debate concerning the role of government and the 
private religious beliefs of citizens.19 
Within the first several pages of the PPACA was Title I, Sec-
tion 1001(5), enacted as Title 42, Section 300gg-13(a)(4).  In relevant 
part, subsection (a)(4) reads: 
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer of-
fering group or individual health insurance coverage 
shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not 
impose any cost sharing requirements for—with re-
spect to women, such additional preventative care and 
screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided 
for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the 
Health Resources and Services Administration for 
purposes of this paragraph.20 
Utilizing this language, the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices created what has now become known as the Health and Human 
Services Contraception Mandate (“HHS Mandate”).21  Under the 
HHS Mandate, contraceptive services are now included under the 
umbrella of preventative care for women.22  At the same time, the 
Mandate granted an exemption to religious institutions.23  Despite 
this exemption, religious groups and individuals across the country 
found this exemption too greatly truncated in comparison to other 
 
17 Id. 
18 PPACA, supra note 5. 
19 Editorial, A New Battle Over Contraception, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/opinion/sunday/a-new-battle-over-contraception.html 
[hereinafter A New Battle]. 
20 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2006). 
21 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011). 
22 Women’s Preventative Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines [hereinaf-
ter HRSA Guidelines], HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
23 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011). 
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comparable federal laws and regulations.24 
At the time of this Comment’s writing, there have been sever-
al iterations of the HHS Mandate, the most recent25 being offered as a 
compromise in an effort to quell the furor caused by the strict word-
ing of the previously adopted final rule.26  First introduced in July of 
2010, it was suggested that 45 CFR Subtitle A add section 
147.130(a)(1)(iv) to match the proposed language of “coverage of 
preventive health services”
 27 as was enacted by the PPACA.28  Origi-
nally, there was no exemption to the coverage mandate.29  In an effort 
to accommodate religious institutions with objections to contracep-
tive coverage, the agency promulgated the original exemption lan-
guage in August 2011.30  The exemption defines a religious employer 
as one that: “(1) has the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; 
(2) primarily employs persons who share its religious tenets; (3) pri-
marily serves persons who share its religious tenets; and (4) is a non-
profit organization described in section 6033(a)(1) and section 
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Code.”31 
After a flurry of disapproval, the exemption was adopted as a 
 
24 A New Battle, supra note 19.  Compare 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (setting forth requirements 
dictating what is a religious employer), with Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
12187 (2006) (exempting “religious organizations or entities controlled by religious organi-
zations, including places of worship”) and Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) 
(2006) (“This subchapter [on equal opportunity employment] shall not apply to an employer 
with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, as-
sociation, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of 
a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”). 
25 Coverage of Certain Preventable Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 
8456 (Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.130) [hereinafter Coverage of Certain 
Preventable Services]. 
26 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to the Coverage of Preventa-
tive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,725 
(Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Group Health Plans I]. 
27 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 
Fed. Reg. 41,726, 41,759 (July 19, 2010) [hereinafter Interim Final Rules for Group Health 
Plans]. 
28 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13. 
29 See Preventative Services under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, supra 
note 27, at 41, 759. 
30 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to the Coverage of Preventa-
tive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 46621, 
46,626 (Aug. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Group Health Plans II]. 
31 Id. 
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final rule and a “safe harbor” period was implemented.32  This “safe 
harbor” period temporarily stayed the enforcement of the contracep-
tive coverage mandate for non-exempted, non-profit organizations 
while the department determined a means to accommodate such 
groups.33  In February 2012, the adoption of the final rule on mandat-
ed coverage of contraception was announced.34  The Final Rule an-
nouncement explained that statistics, public comments on the matter, 
and the wording of the PPACA overwhelmingly supported the nar-
row exemption proposed by the amendment in August 2011.35  In 
February 2013, another amendment was proposed that would greatly 
expand the exemption and allow for exemption of specific institu-
tions currently not covered by the exemption.36 
III. DELEGATION, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, AND FREE EXERCISE 
The nature of government, the role of the individual branches 
in our tripartite system of government, and the interpretation of the 
Constitution have all experienced transformations since the founding 
of the United States.37  Even more so, this past century has seen sig-
nificant advances in technology, great cultural movements, and 
changes in interpersonal relations.  This Section will provide insight 
into the changes that have occurred in the realm of Congressional 
delegation and the First Amendment’s guarantee regarding freedom 
of religion. 
A. The Nondelegation Doctrine in the Twentieth 
Century 
Following the Preamble, the very first words of the Constitu-
tion of the United States read: “All legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist 
of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”38  Though a seemingly 
 
32 Group Health Plans I, supra note 26, at 8727. 
33 Id. at 8727-28. 
34 Id. at 8730. 
35 Id. at 8726-27. 
36 Coverage of Certain Preventable Services, supra note 25. 
37 The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, U.S. SUPREME COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
about/constitutional.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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innocuous prescription, this section of the Constitution, also known 
as the Nondelegation Clause,39 has spawned a doctrine of proscrip-
tion that has a legacy dating back more than a century, most cogently 
recognized in the 1892 decision of Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark.40 
More than 120 years ago, the Supreme Court explained that it 
was universally recognized that the legislative power of the Congress 
could not be delegated to the Executive branch without compromis-
ing the integrity of the tripartite system of government established by 
the Constitution.41  In an attempt to better illustrate the limitations of 
Article I, Section 1, the Court referenced two particular State Su-
preme Court decisions from Ohio and Pennsylvania.42  Drawing upon 
the language of Rail Road Co. v. Commissioners,43 Justice Harlan ex-
plained that there was a marked difference between the “delegation of 
power to make the law . . . and conferring authority or discretion as to 
its execution.”44  In Rail Road Co. v. Commissioners, the Ohio Su-
preme Court explained the difference between legislative and execu-
tive discretion, noting that the power to make law involves discretion 
as to what the law shall command or prohibit and the authority to ex-
ecute the law involves the discretion to implement and exercise the 
law.45  In an attempt to further distinguish the delegation of power to 
make law and the grant of discretion to implement law, the Court 
borrowed language from Pennsylvania’s Locke’s Appeal.46  It was 
held in Locke that “[t]he legislature cannot delegate its power to 
make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine 
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to 
make, its own action depend.”47  In finding the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court’s distinction applicable to the controversy before it in 
1892, the Marshall Field Court reiterated an understanding that alt-
hough Congress may not delegate its authority to create laws, it is 
 
39 The Recent Controversy over the Non Delegation Doctrine, ENVTL. LAW & PROP. RTS 
PRACTICE GROUP NEWSLETTER (Fed. Soc., D.C.) Oct. 1, 1999. 
40 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
41 Id. at 692. 
42 Id. at 693-94. 
43 The Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville, Rail Road Co. v. Comm’rs of Clinton 
Cnty., 1 Ohio St. 77 (1852). 
44 Field, 143 U.S. at 693-94 (citing Rail Road Co., 1 Ohio St. 77). 
45 Rail Road Co., 1 Ohio St. at 88. 
46 72 Pa. 491 (1873). 
47 Id. at 498. 
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very much able to delegate the authority to create implementation 
strategy and standards.48 
The issue was next handled in earnest approximately thirty-
five years later in the case of J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United 
States.49  In this decision, regarding Congress’s ability to grant the 
Executive branch authority to alter tariff rates, the Court cited not on-
ly Field v. Clark, but also Rail Road Co. v. Commissioners.50  As in 
the aforementioned cases, the Court in J.W. Hampton was faced with 
the issue of whether vesting the Executive branch with the authority 
to determine details of execution and penalty of a duly passed Con-
gressional law was valid under Article I, Section 1 and Article I, Sec-
tion 8 of the Constitution,51 each of which respectively granted all 
legislative power52 and further governing powers to the Congress.
 53  
Drawing upon the earlier Supreme Court decision of Interstate Com-
merce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co.,54 the Court held that 
“[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible princi-
ple to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is di-
rected to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delega-
tion of legislative power.”55  This holding later became the standard 
rule for cases in which the Court had to determine whether Congress 
 
48 Field, 143 U.S. at 694. 
49 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
50 Id. at 407, 410. 
51 Id. at 404. 
52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting all legislative powers “in a Congress of the United 
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives”). 
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, . . . bor-
row money on credit of the United States, . . . regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, . . . 
establish an [sic] uniform Rule of Naturalization, . . . coin Money, . . . provide for the Pun-
ishment of counterfeiting, . . . establish Post Offices, . . . promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, . . . define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, . . . 
raise and support Armies, . . . provide and maintain a Navy, . . . make Rules for the govern-
ment and Regulation of land and naval Forces, . . . provide for calling forth the Militia to ex-
ecute the Laws of the Union, . . . provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the mili-
tia, . . . exercise exclusive legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District, . . . make 
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper”). 
54 224 U.S. 194 (1912).  “The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative power to a 
commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission 
shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular 
situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter 
within the rules laid down by the Congress.”  Id. at 214. 
55 J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
8
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had delegated legislative authority or discretion of implementation.56 
During the New Deal era of the 1930s, the Court once again 
wrote several opinions regarding propriety of delegation to the Exec-
utive branch in cases such as Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan57 (“Hot 
Oil”) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,58 both 
dealing with the National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”).59  In the 
Hot Oil case, the Court rejected Title 1, Section 9(c) of NIRA, which 
authorized the president to prohibit the transportation of petroleum60 
on the basis that the section gave him the authority to make policy 
and enforce such policy at his discretion.61  Further, the Court found 
that none of the provisions surrounding Section 9(c) provided any 
limitation on the discretion granted to the president, thus vesting him 
with legislative authority.62  In his dissent, Justice Cardozo explained 
that he found the delegation of power to the president not to be un-
limited, but rather to be “canalized within banks that keep it from 
overflowing.”63  He explained that both Field and J.W. Hampton es-
tablished a standard with “elasticity for adjustment,” different from 
what he perceived to be the majority’s application of the standard 
with “pedantic rigor.”64 
In Schechter, the Court similarly held that the “Live Poultry 
Code” created under the authority of Section three of NIRA was un-
constitutional on the ground that it essentially granted the president 
the authority to codify “codes of fair competition” into law.65  The 
 
56 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (Hot Oil), 293 U.S. 388 (1935); see also A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
57 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
58 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
59 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 195-211, repealed by Ex. Ord. No. 7252, 
Dec. 21, 1935. 
60 Title I, Section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act reads: 
The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and 
foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or 
withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be pro-
duced or withdrawn from storage by any state law or valid regulation or 
order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other 
duly authorized agency of a State. 
Hot Oil, 293 U.S. at 406. 
61 Hot Oil, 293 U.S. at 416. 
62 Id. at 420. 
63 Id. at 440 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
64 Id. 
65 Schechter, 295 U.S. at 521-22, 529. 
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Court held that Section three “sets up no standards, aside from the 
statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expla-
nation described in section one.”66  The decision was joined by Jus-
tice Cardozo, who commented, “[T]his code is not canalized within 
banks that keep it from overflowing.  It is unconfined and vagrant if I 
may borrow my own words in an earlier opinion.”67  In other words, 
as far as Justice Cardozo was concerned, the language granting the 
president the discretion in the Live Poultry Code was much broader 
and less confining than the language found in the grant of discretion 
provided in Hot Oil.  In so holding, the Court in Hot Oil and Schecht-
er deemed the intelligible principle of the legislation to be lacking in 
specificity.68 
A decade later, the Court held in American Power & Light 
Co. v. SEC69 that as long as “Congress clearly delineates the general 
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of 
this delegated authority,”70 a delegation to the Executive will be a 
constitutional delegation of discretion and not of legislative authori-
ty.71  Despite Hot Oil, Schechter, and affirmation of the J.W. Hamp-
ton rule in American Power, the Court began to adopt a more lenient 
approach to applying the “intelligible principle” test, very rarely, if 
ever, finding delegations to be unconstitutional.72  As Justice Scalia 
explained in the 2001 Whitman v. American Trucking Association73 
case, “[W]e have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Con-
gress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be 
left to those executing or applying the law.’ ”74  Justice Scalia’s point 
 
66 Id. at 541. 
67 Id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (referencing Hot Oil). 
68 Hot Oil, 293 U.S. 388 (holding 8-1, Justice Cardozo dissenting); Schechter, 295 U.S. 
495 (holding unanimously, Justice Cardozo concurring). 
69 Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946). 
70 Id. at 105. 
71 Id. 
72 The Court has a long history of allowing Congress to grant Executive agencies broad 
discretion in determining if Congress’s vague standards have been met.  See, e.g., Yakus v. 
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1994) (“fair and equitable”); Lichter v. United States, 334 
U.S. 742, 785-786 (1948) (“excessive profits”); Am. Power, 329 U.S. at 105 (“unfair and 
inequitable”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 691, 600 (1944) 
(“just and reasonable”); Nat’l Broad. Co., v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (“as 
public interest, convenience, or necessity [require]”). 
73 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
74 Id. at 474-75 (quoting Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 
(1989)). 
10
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is further illustrated by a list of decisions in Mistretta v. United 
States75 indicating that in the 1940s alone, just a few scant years after 
the NIRA decisions, the Supreme Court had approved such broad 
delegations of authority.76 
B. Freedom of Religion Under the First Amendment 
According to some scholars, religious freedom was not just 
the impetus for religious sects to leave Europe for the New World to 
establish enclaves77 but it was also, in the view of James Madison and 
Thomas Jefferson, “a central feature of the reformed and republican 
government.”78  Religious freedom in the seventeenth century was 
very different from today.  During the age of exploration, toleration 
was the extent of religious freedom, compared to the broader, more 
modern concept of free exercise.79 
To best understand how the colonies came to be founded upon 
religious lines,80 it is important to understand the history and politics 
of Europe during the preceding centuries and, in particular, England.  
Often credited as the catalyst for increased religious persecution in 
England, King Henry VIII seized control of the English Church in an 
effort to annul his marriage following the Pope’s disapproval.81  With 
this seizure came a joining of the ecclesiastic influence of the church 
and the political influence of the monarchy.  As the joint head of the-
se two powerful influences, Henry VIII utilized persecution and re-
pression of other faiths as means of achieving political ends.82  Ed-
 
75 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989). 
76 See cases cited supra note 72. 
77 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 50 (1998). 
78 WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 29 
(1986). 
79 Id. at 4. 
80 NOONAN, JR., supra note 77, at 50.  (“New Plymouth was founded by Separatists from 
the Church of England who were committed to a church composed of the born-again.  Mas-
sachusetts Bay Colony was founded by Christians seeking a purer church than the Church of 
England.”). 
81 T. Daniel Shumate, Introduction, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE LEGACY OF GEORGE 
MASON 9, 14 (T. Daniel Shumate ed., 1985). 
82 Id. at 15.  See also G. M. TREVELYAN, ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF ENGLAND 298-99 (Il-
lustrated Ed. 1966).  “Henry VIII burnt Protestants, while hanging and beheading Catholic 
opponents of an anti-clerical revolution.  And this policy, which appears so strange to-day 
[sic], then met with much popular approval in England.”  Id. 
11
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ward VI, Henry’s successor, oversaw the slow shift of the Church of 
England towards Protestantism with a favoritism placed upon the 
Protestants.83  Edward’s successor and sister, Mary, favored the 
Catholics, a practice that threatened the stability of the nation.84  Dur-
ing the reign of Elizabeth, the sister of Edward VI and Mary, tensions 
were tight in England with rising Anti-Catholicism caused mainly by 
the threat of the Armada and the attempt to overthrow Elizabeth by 
Catholic Spain.85  Following Elizabeth was a line of monarchs insist-
ing they “ruled with absolute power by divine right.”86  By the time 
the reign of Charles began in 1625, friction among the various Chris-
tian factions within England was widespread.87  Only a few decades 
later the Anglican Church was dissolved and Calvinist Oliver Crom-
well led the charge against Roman Catholics in Ireland.88 
Considering the political and religious quagmire that was sev-
enteenth century England, it should come as little surprise that as 
English holdings in the United States grew, each religion found its 
home in one colony or another.89  While the concentration of specific 
religious groups in certain colonies served the purpose of freedom of 
religion sought by many of the former English folk, the modern con-
cept of religious freedom would not even begin to be considered until 
the drafting of the United States Constitution.  However, one of the 
 
83 TREVELYAN, supra note 82, at 312.  As a young king, ascending to the throne at the age 
of nine, Edward conducted his rule by counsel of advisors, including his uncles of mixed 
religions.  Id.  Hugh Latimer, a major figure in the emerging Protestant movement, played a 
large role in Edward’s religious life and influenced his rule of England.  Id. at 313. 
84 Id. at 320-21.  Mary’s favoritism of Catholics went beyond disfavor but resembled 
more of a fanaticism when she “revived the heresy laws allowing the spiritual courts and the 
Privy Council to burn alive believing Protestants at their pleasure.”  Id. at 320.  In less than 
four years, the Queen had burnt more than 400 men and women alive.  TREVELYAN, supra 
note 82, at 321.  In response to Mary’s zealous policies, “Protestant zeal” surfaced among 
the commoners.  Id. 
85 Shumate, supra note 81, at 16.  During the time of her reign, Elizabeth did her best to 
rectify the situation, reinstating Protestantism as the State Church and keeping persecution of 
Catholics to a minimum.  TREVELYAN, supra note 82, at 321 n.1.  With the threat of the Ar-
mada of Catholic Spain looming, Elizabeth was even successful at maintaining the loyalty of 
moderate Catholics alongside the Protestants.  Id. at 353. 
86 Shumate, supra note 81, at 16. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 17-18. 
89 Id. at 33 (explaining that Anglicans were in the south and New York; Puritans con-
trolled New England with the exception of Rhode Island, which was controlled partly by 
Roger Williams and partly by the Baptists; the Quakers in early Pennsylvania and West Jer-
sey; the Catholics in Maryland; and the Presbyterians made a stronghold in Pennsylvania). 
12
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earliest attempts at legally protecting religious freedom arose during 
the drafting of the Virginia Convention.90  Introduced by George Ma-
son in 1776, the Virginia Declaration of Rights is considered to be 
the “grandfather of all the bills of rights.”91  Under Mason’s initial 
draft, “[r]eligion was to be ‘governed only by Reason and Convic-
tion, not by Force or Violence; and therefore . . . all Men shou’d en-
joy the fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Religion, according to the 
Dictates of Conscience.’ ”92  For some members of the convention, 
such as young James Madison, toleration alone was insufficient to 
protect the religious rights of the citizens.93 
While attending the College of New Jersey (now Princeton), 
Madison was exposed to the teachings and arguments of the 
“Whiggish prerevolutionary atmosphere” that found the term “tolera-
tion” to be troublesome.94  The students of the College of New Jersey 
regularly argued, and were bolstered by the agreement of College 
President John Witherspoon, that toleration was a concept of conde-
scension in that it implied “some institution or belief [to be] in a su-
perior position from which to do the tolerating.”95  Madison’s adop-
tion of this opinion is clear, for shortly after Mason presented his 
draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, Madison successfully 
suggested expanding the “fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Reli-
gion”96 to be an “unqualified freedom of conscience.”97 
Modern discourses on freedom of religion focus primarily on 
the concern of free exercise, with the first half of the clause relegated 
to the occasional conversation of whether a law by Congress favors 
one religion over another, since the establishment of a state religion is 
expressly and unambiguously prohibited by the First Amendment.98  
Although a foreign concept to modern Americans, the establishment 
of State or Federal religions was endorsed by many statesmen during 
 
90 Robert Rutland, George Mason and the Origins of the First Amendment, in THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 81, 91 (T. Daniel Shumate ed., 1985). 
91 Id. at 90. 
92 Id. at 91. 
93 MILLER, supra note 78, at 29. 
94 Id. at 4. 
95 Id. 
96 Rutland, supra note 90, at 91. 
97 See MILLER, supra note 78 (discussing Madison’s disdain for “mere toleration”). 
98 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
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the colonial and revolutionary periods.99  For such a reason, the origi-
nal draft proposed by Madison reading, “[t]he civil rights of none 
shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall 
any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal right 
of conscience be in any manner, or under any pretext infringed,” 
drew criticism.100  Several drafts of the First Amendment went 
through committees which vigorously debated the non-establishment 
clause, with particular concern raised by a delegate from Rhode Is-
land regarding a minister’s ability to sue in state court.101  However, 
most troubling to many delegates was the implication that the non-
establishment clause would apply to the states and prohibit the states 
from providing financial aid and assistance to the favorite religious 
body in their borders.102  Despite the severe trimming of Madison’s 
Amendment, the Congress eventually passed the bill with the final 
language reading, “Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”103 
C. Free Exercise and the Court 
Starting with the early Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court 
saw a boom in the number of cases seeking review of the constitu-
tionality of legislation that allegedly infringed upon the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment.104  Below are the facts and analyses 
of two seminal cases regarding the contemporary interpretation of the 
Free Exercise Clause.  These two cases created separate rules that 
courts were to apply when dealing with these constitutional issues. 
i. The Sherbert Test 
Appellant Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, was released 
 
99 NOONAN, JR., supra note 77, at 82 (regarding the First Congress which “petitioned the 
president to set a day of thanksgiving to God; created chaplaincies; and made grants of pub-
lic property for the support of religion”). 
100 Id. at 79. 
101 Id. at 80.  “Ban of an establishment, however, drew criticism.  Suppose, said Mr. Hun-
tington of Rhode Island, that a minister brought suit in federal court for his salary, the 
amendment might lead to denial of his suit, for ‘a support of ministers might be construed 
[as] a religious establishment.’ ”  Id. 
102 Id. 
103 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
104 See infra Parts III.C.i. & ii. 
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from employment by her employer after refusing to work on Satur-
days.105  Thus, she was terminated for refusing to work on her day of 
Sabbath.106  The addition of a sixth workday, at the time, was a new 
development at the textile-mill that employed Sherbert.107  Due to her 
“conscientious scruples” regarding Saturday labor, Sherbert had no 
luck obtaining work in other mills that had also implemented a six 
day work-week policy.108  As a result, Sherbert applied for compensa-
tion benefits from the state under the South Carolina Unemployment 
Compensation Act.109 
Upon review of her application, the Employment Security 
Commission found Sherbert to be ineligible to collect benefits be-
cause she disqualified herself in refusing work that required Saturday 
labor.110  The Commission found that Sherbert had “fail[ed], without 
good cause, to accept ‘suitable work when offered . . . by the em-
ployment office or the employer[,]’ ”111 therefore disqualifying her 
under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act.112  At 
trial, Sherbert argued that the disqualification section of the South 
Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act113 ran afoul of her reli-
gious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment.114  However, the Commission’s ruling was sustained in the lo-
cal Court of Common Pleas and affirmed by the South Carolina 
Supreme Court.115  The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the 
statute “places no restriction upon the appellant’s freedom of religion 
nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her right and 
freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the dic-
 
105 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 399 n.1. 
108 Id. at 399. 
109 Id. at 399-400; S. C. Code, Tit. 68, §§ 68-114(3)(a) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 41-35-120(5)(a)(i)(B)). 
110 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401. 
111 Id.; see S. C. Code, Tit. 68, §§ 68-114(3) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-
120(5)(a)(i)(B)). 
112 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401; S. C. Code, Tit. 68, §§ 68-114(3)(a) (current version at S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 41-35-120(5)(a)(i)(B)). 
113 S. C. Code, Tit. 68, §§ 68-114 (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-120). 
114 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401; U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . . ”). 
115 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401. 
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tate of her conscience.”116  On appeal, the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States granted certiorari.117 
In its opinion, the Court examined whether the South Carolina 
Unemployment Compensation Act burdened a worker’s freedom to 
practice religion when accepting work would directly affect an indi-
vidual’s ability to observe his or her religion.118  In short, the Court 
sought to determine if South Carolina’s statute was unconstitutional 
because it failed to account for religious individuals who could not 
work due to religious obligations.  The Court proceeded to illustrate 
that most of the previous decisions regarding infringement of an indi-
vidual’s free exercise had often been easily determined.119  However, 
there were some instances in which the government infringed on free 
exercise rights in the name of “public safety, peace or order.”120 
The Court stated that in order for legislation or regulation to 
survive Constitutional challenge under the Free Exercise Clause, the 
statute must either place no burden upon one’s constitutional right to 
freely exercise religion,121 or, in the event that the legislation does in-
deed infringe upon constitutional rights, any burden must be justified 
by a “compelling state interest.”122  In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Douglas deftly noted that the result reached by the Court should not 
necessarily focus upon the degree to which the infringement bur-
dened the individual, but whether there was an infringement at all.123  
According to Justice Douglas, the First Amendment was meant to 
keep government out of that area of privacy, not to provide the gov-
ernment with a range of how far it could intrude.124 
 
116 Id. (citing 240 S.C. 286, 303-04). 
117 Id. at 401-02. 
118 Id. at 406. 
119 Id. at 402 (explaining that previous cases held that the “[g]overnment may neither 
compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or 
groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities, nor employ the taxing 
power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views”) (internal citations omitted). 
120 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (“[T]he Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exer-
cise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or 
principles, for ‘even when the action is in accord with one’s religious convictions, [it] is not 
totally free from legislative restrictions.’  The conduct or actions so regulated have invaria-
bly posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order . . . . ” (citing Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603)). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). 
123 Id. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
124 Id. 
16
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In order to determine whether the disqualification sections of 
the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act would survive 
constitutional challenge, the Court first addressed whether the South 
Carolina statute disqualifying Sherbert from collecting unemploy-
ment proved to be a burden on her free exercise of religion.125  To an-
swer this, the Court referred to an earlier decision in which it held 
that any law that has the purpose or effect of impeding one’s ob-
servance of religion, or discriminates among religions either directly 
or indirectly, is to be deemed burdensome.126  According to Braunfeld 
v. Brown,127 such a law would be “constitutionally invalid.”128  In de-
scribing the ruling of South Carolina’s Supreme Court, the Sherbert 
Court explained that the State forces individuals to choose between 
either accepting work and forfeiting religious observance or forfeiting 
work in order to observe a religious precept.129 Accordingly, the 
Sherbert Court found that such a policy forcing such a decision pe-
nalizes individuals who choose to follow the precepts of their reli-
gion, thus infringing upon free exercise of their religious rights.130 
After determining that a burden upon free exercise did exist, 
the Court next addressed whether such an imposition was justified by 
a compelling state interest.131  According to precedent, “in this highly 
sensitive constitutional area, ‘only the gravest abuses, endangering 
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.’ ”132   
As such, only paramount interests of the state were legitimate enough 
to permit placing a burden on the ability to practice one’s religion. 
As justification, the State claimed that the possibility of 
fraudulent claims effectively diluting the compensation fund and hin-
dering Saturday scheduling for employers was a paramount interest 
for South Carolina.133  The Court rejected this argument, adding that 
even if this was a legitimate excuse, it would still be the State’s re-
 
125 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. 
126 Id. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld). 
127 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). 
128 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 406. 
131 Id.  In Braunfield, the Court held that a compelling state interest would justify the 
state’s encroachment into an individual’s free exercise of religion.  Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 
607. 
132 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
133 Id. 
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sponsibility to demonstrate that this policy was the least restrictive 
form of regulation to prevent such abuses.134  Since South Carolina 
lacked a “countervailing factor,”135 such as the “strong state interest 
in providing one uniform day of rest for all workers”
 136 as articulated 
in Braunfeld, the Court found that the State’s justification for making 
Sherbert’s religion a basis for ineligibility was not a compelling State 
interest.137  The Court thus determined that in order for a statute to 
survive constitutional challenge, the State must prove that the statute 
does not burden free exercise and if it does, the statute is the least re-
strictive means of serving a paramount state interest.  These elements 
subsequently became known as the Sherbert test.138 
In his conclusion, Justice Brennan explained that the Court 
was holding that South Carolina could not enforce the ineligibility 
statute against an individual whose religious convictions prevented 
him from working on a day of rest without violating the Constitu-
tion.139  The Court’s intention in issuing such a narrow holding was to 
prevent the decision from being read to dictate any particular scheme 
upon which states were to build benefit programs.140  Although the 
Court’s holding was not supposed to be seen as tinkering with the 
structure of any welfare/benefit program, its decision achieved its 
goal of reaffirming that states are prohibited from infringing upon in-
dividuals’ rights to religious exercise in determining eligibility for 
such programs, unless such an infringement could be justified by a 
 
134 Id. at 407.  “For even if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the fund 
and disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to 
demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without in-
fringing First Amendment rights.”  (internal citations omitted).  The Court also took note of 
several decisions from the Supreme Courts of North Carolina, Michigan, and Ohio, which 
had previously “granted benefits to person who were physically available for work but una-
ble to find suitable employment solely because of a religious prohibition against Saturday 
work.”  See id. at 407 n.7. 
135 Id. at 408. 
136 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408. 
137 See id. at 409. 
138 Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 1176, 1183-84 (jurisd.1973) 
(explaining that “[t]he Sherbert test set forth above and as applied to this case requires a 
showing by the government that a decision protecting the religious activity in question 
would be likely to result in placing a substantial burden on the ability of the Internal Reve-
nue Service to collect the tax revenues to which it is entitled”). 
139 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410. 
140 Id. 
18
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compelling state interest.141 
ii. The Smith Test 
Alfred Smith and Galen Black worked together at a private 
drug rehabilitation organization in Oregon.142  The two were subse-
quently fired from their positions with the rehabilitation organization 
for ingesting peyote.143  The peyote the pair ingested was used in a 
sacramental manner during a Native American Church ceremony.144  
Both Smith and Black were members of the Native American 
Church.145  Upon being fired, respondents sought unemployment 
compensation from the Employment Division of Oregon, which de-
termined that the two were “ineligible for benefits because they had 
been discharged for work-related ‘misconduct.’ ”146 
Under Oregon state law, the intentional possession of a con-
trolled substance, as defined by federal law147 and modified by Ore-
gon state law,148 is prohibited unless a doctor prescribes such a sub-
stance.149  Because Oregon classified peyote as a Schedule I drug,150 
possession of such drug is a Class B felony.151  Furthermore, the Ore-
gon Supreme Court only a few years earlier held that its state statute 
 
141 Id. 
142 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). 
143 Id.  Peyote is defined as “any of several cacti related to or resembling mescal.”  
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 991 (2d ed. 2000).  Also called MESCAL 
BUTTON . . . one of the dried tops of the mescal cactus, containing the hallucinogen mesca-
lin.”  Id. at 831. 
144 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.   
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 874; see Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811, 812 (2006). 
148 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874; see Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.005(6) (1987) (defining “controlled 
substance”). 
149 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874; see Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4) (1987) (current version at § 
475.752(3) (2011)).  In relevant part, the statute reads, “It is unlawful for any person know-
ingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained 
directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the 
course of professional practice . . . .”  Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.752(3). 
150 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874; see Ore. Admin. Rule 855-080-0021(3) (1988). 
151 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874; see Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4)(a) (current version at § 
475.752(3)(a) (2011)).  In relevant part, the statute reads: “Any person who violates this sub-
section with respect to: (a) A controlled substance in Schedule I, is guilty of a Class B felo-
ny, except as otherwise provided in ORS 475.864.”  Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.752(3)(a). 
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does not exempt sacramental use of drugs.152  After remand from the 
Supreme Court of the United States,153 Oregon’s highest court found 
the prohibition to be invalid, determining that the State “could not 
deny unemployment benefits to respondents for having engaged in 
that [religious] practice [of ingesting peyote].”154  The Employment 
Division appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari once 
again to consider whether Oregon’s prohibition of peyote ingestion 
for religious use was permissible under the Free Exercise Clause.155 
In the majority opinion, penned by Justice Scalia, the Court 
started by attempting to define free exercise of religion.  According to 
Scalia, free exercise of religion is a freedom of conscience to believe 
and profess whatever religious doctrine or creed one desires.156  Fur-
thermore, free exercise is not confined strictly to belief and profes-
sion of faith, but also extends to the fulfillment of the prescriptions 
and proper adherence to the proscriptions of religions.157  The Court 
concluded its definition of free exercise claiming that a state would 
certainly be burdening one’s right to free exercise if the legal prohibi-
tion against certain acts applied only when performed for a religious 
purpose or only when related to a religious belief.158  Thus, the Court 
maintained that requiring adherence to generally applicable laws 
which may contradict a religious prescription or proscription does not 
necessarily prohibit free exercise of religion.159 
 
152 Smith, 494 U.S. at 876 (quoting 307 Ore. 68, 72-73 (1988)). 
153 Emp’t  Div., Dept. of  Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith (Smith I), 485 U.S. 660 (1988).  
In Smith I, the Court acknowledged that “if a State has prohibited through its criminal laws 
certain kinds of religiously motivated conduct without violating the First Amendment, it cer-
tainly follows that it may impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment benefits to 
person who engage in that conduct.”  Id. at 670.  Since Oregon’s courts had yet to determine 
whether the state prohibition on peyote ingestion also applied to religious and sacramental 
purposes, the Court determined that it would not be “appropriate . . . to decide whether the 
practice is protected by the Federal Constitution.”  Id. at 673.  Accordingly, the case was re-
manded for further proceedings to determine the status of religious consumption of peyote.  
Id. at 674. 
154 Smith, 494 U.S. at 876. 
155 Id.  (“This case requires us to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the 
reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and thus permits the State to de-
ny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously 
inspired use.”). 
156 Id. at 877. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 877-78. 
159 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
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Appealing to precedent, the Court explained that “the right of 
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to com-
ply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the 
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his reli-
gion prescribes (or proscribes).’ ”160  Furthermore, it would seem that 
the only instances in which the Court found a neutral, generally ap-
plicable law inapplicable to religious behavior was when a “hybrid 
situation” was present—meaning that the law in question affected not 
only the Free Exercise Clause but another constitutional protection, 
such as freedom of speech or print.161  In the instant case, the Court 
found that no such hybrid situation was present.162 
Upon deciding that the only issue before the Court was that of 
free exercise of religion, the Court explained that not only had the 
Sherbert test been less popular in application leading up to the instant 
case, but that it was generally inapplicable as it pertained to the pre-
sent case.163  According to the Court’s previous decision in Bowen v. 
Roy,164 the “decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the propo-
sition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemp-
tions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious 
hardship’ without compelling reason.”165  Thus, in cases lacking indi-
vidual exemptions, the Sherbert test is not to be used. 
What is made clear from Smith is that the Court distinguishes 
among neutral, generally applicable laws and laws that have individ-
ual exemptions.  Following this distinction, it is important to recog-
nize the implications of one of the Court’s later statements: “[W]e 
cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied 
to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not 
protect an interest of the highest order.”166 
 
160 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
161 Id. at 881-82 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (religion/speech); 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (religion/speech); Follett v. McCormick, 321 
U.S. 573 (1944) (religion/speech); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (religion 
/ rights of parents); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (religion / rights of parents)). 
162 Id. at 882. 
163 Id. at 885. 
164 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
165 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. at 708). 
166 Id. at 888.  In essence, what the Court is claiming here is that in the interest of judicial 
efficiency, all regulations will be presumed to be constitutionally valid in terms of protection 
of rights. 
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IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
A. Intelligible Principles and the New Millennium 
Beginning in the 1980s, the approach of some Justices regard-
ing delegation evolved.  For example, in the Whitman v. American 
Trucking Association167 decision, Justice Thomas filed a concurring 
opinion in which he questioned the wisdom of the Intelligible Princi-
ple Doctrine.168 
The Court held in Whitman that although Congress set forth a 
broad delegation standard for the Environmental Protection Agency, 
it still served as an intelligible principle when compared to some of 
the other standards the Court had previously accepted.169  In his con-
currence, Justice Thomas mentioned that despite the fact that the ar-
gument before the Court was one regarding the constitutionality of 
the delegation, the parties briefed with “barely a nod to the text of the 
Constitution.”170  He further remarked that if anything, the concept of 
intelligible principle further complicates very simple Constitutional 
language: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress.”171 
In ending his concurrence, Justice Thomas stated very clearly 
that if the proper case were to present itself he would be willing to 
reexamine whether the Court has strayed too far from the original in-
tent and understanding of separation of powers.  As of this Com-
ment’s writing, there is little evidence to suggest that such a case has 
arisen. 
B. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the 
States 
In direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, 
 
167 Whitman, 531 U.S. 457.  Under Congressional legislation, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency was delegated authority to determine air quality standards necessary to protect 
the public health.  Id.  The American Trucking Association claimed this was a delegation of 
legislative authority.  Id. 
168 Id. at 486-87.   
169 See cases cited supra note 72. 
170 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 487. 
171 Id. (quoting U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 1). 
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Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”).172 RFRA’s Congressional findings explained that in 
Smith, “the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that 
the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws 
neutral toward religion . . . .”173  In dismissing the test set forth in 
Smith as unworkable, compared to the workable compelling interest 
test established in earlier federal decisions, Congress clearly rejected 
the Smith test and opted to codify the test established in Sherbert to 
best provide individuals with claims and defenses when their reli-
gious exercise is substantially burdened by a governmental body.174 
The test established by RFRA is actually stricter than the 
Sherbert test.  RFRA adds an additional element requiring the gov-
ernment to prove that the burden placed upon an individual’s free ex-
ercise of religion was the least restrictive means of serving that com-
pelling governmental interest; thus, the government is prohibited 
from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the 
government can demonstrate that “application of the burden to the 
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.”175  The statute also clarifies the definition of 
“government,” using the term to encompass “a branch, department, 
agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under 
color of law) of the United States, or of a covered entity . . . .”176 
Despite RFRA’s overwhelming support in Congress,177 in the 
1997 decision of City of Boerne v. Flores,178 the Supreme Court held 
 
172 Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). 
173 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4). 
174 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b). 
175 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (requiring that the State illus-
trate that there was no burden on a person’s exercise of religion, or in the event of a burden, 
that such a burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest), with Sherbert, 374 
U.S. at 403 (requiring that the State illustrate that there was no infringement on an individu-
al’s constitutional rights of free exercise or, in the event of a burden, the State must illustrate 
that such infringement is justified by a “compelling state interest”). 
176 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1). 
177 Bill Summary and Status, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (H.R.1308) (listing ma-
jor actions: passed the House by voice vote on 10/27/1993; passed the Senate by Yea-Nay 
Vote of 97-3 on 10/27/1993). 
178 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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RFRA unconstitutional as it applied to the states.179  In Boerne, the 
Archbishop of San Antonio gave a local parish permission to expand 
its church’s structure.180  When the parish applied to the City of 
Boerne for a building permit, the City denied the application, citing 
an ordinance that required the Historic Landmark Commission to ap-
prove any construction in the historic district in which the church was 
located.181  The Archbishop commenced proceedings against the City 
of Boerne, primarily relying upon RFRA.182 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision 
finding RFRA unconstitutional as it applies to the states, explaining 
that the heavy litigation resulting from the Act, coupled with the lim-
iting effect that the Act had on the states’ police powers placed ex-
cessive burdens upon the states.183  Furthermore, the Court explained 
that the imposition of the least restrictive means requirement, which 
was not part of any pre-Smith test, placed an additional burden on the 
states.184  The Court further indicated that the legislation was far 
broader than necessary or appropriate in order to serve its purpose of 
preventing and remedying violations of the Free Exercise Clause.185  
Accordingly, the Court determined that despite Congress’s broad 
powers under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,186 RFRA violated the very idea of federalism and federal-state 
balance, and was thus unconstitutional as it applied to the states.187 
Despite the Flores decision, the Court has maintained that 
RFRA is constitutional when applied to federal laws.188  In the case 
of Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,189 
the Supreme Court found that although the appellees utilized 
Hoasca,190 a substance prohibited under the Controlled Substance 
 
179 Id. at 536. 
180 Id. at 512. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Flores, 521 U.S. at 535-36. 
184 Id. at 535. 
185 Id. 
186 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
187 Flores, 521 U.S. at 536. 
188 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
189 546 U.S. 418 (2006) [hereinafter O Centro]. 
190 Ayahuasca is defined as “a woody South American vine, Banisteriopis caapi, of the 
mapighia family, having bark that is the source of harmine, a hallucinogenic alkaloid used by 
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Act,191 in their religious ceremonies, the Government failed to pro-
vide a compelling governmental interest in the barring of the sacra-
mental use of Hoasca, and therefore, violated the free exercise rights 
of the church.192  Although the Court recognized that it had previous-
ly ruled RFRA to be unconstitutional when applied to the states,193 as 
well as the past difficulty in applying the test,194 the Court still illus-
trated deference to Congress’s judgment in enacting RFRA, thus 
maintaining the validity and constitutionality of the Act.195 
Although RFRA may be difficult and onerous for courts to 
apply, the Act is valid law and serves as a supererogatory, yet legisla-
tively desired, constitutional protection.  As noted above, in 2006 the 
Supreme Court upheld the requirement that the federal government 
must demonstrate that a particular action, regulation, or statute has 
not substantially burdened an individual’s free exercise of religion, or 
in the event that it has, did so in furtherance of a compelling govern-
mental interest and was the least restrictive means of furthering that 
interest.196 
V. A COMMENT ON THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
A. Advocacy for the Reapplication of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine 
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution is far from ambiguous.  
It is not difficult to understand what the Framers intended when they 
wrote that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and 
House of Representatives.”197  There is but one way a reader could, 
and should, interpret that sentence, and that is that all legislative 
powers and responsibilities are conferred on Congress. 
 
Indians of the Amazon bain.”  RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 95 (2d ed. 
2000). 
191 O Centro, 546 U.S. at 423. 
192 Id. at 439. 
193 Id. at 424 n.1. 
194 Id. at 439. 
195 Id. 
196 See O Centro, 546 U.S. at 429. 
197 U.S. CONST. art I, § 1. 
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Among the numerous essays Madison wrote under the name 
of Publius, he often referenced a particularly important feature of the 
then newly proposed bicameral legislature system—the election sys-
tem.  In Federalist 37, Madison explained the virtue of having those 
who were elected being dependent on those that elected them.198  He 
stated that because the power is derived from the people, the short 
duration of the elected official’s term forces continued dependence.199  
He further explained that the liberties of the people are best protected 
by frequent elections of representatives,200 reflecting on the maxim 
that “the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its dura-
tion . . . .”201 
In electing a Congress, the people choose representatives that 
they believe will best represent them in the creation of laws and the 
funding of programs.202  When that Congress abdicates its power to 
legislate to a body of bureaucrats, the security provided by its having 
individuals maintain positions at the will of the people is lost.203  
There is an inherent danger in granting the power to legislate to the 
Executive.  Delegation of legislative authority to the very same body 
that possesses the authority to enforce the product of the legislative 
authority amounts to a concentration of power the Founders intended 
to avoid.  Many argue that some decisions are best made by a smaller 
group of individuals who have a significantly higher level of profi-
ciency and expertise in a given area.204  While this is true, without 
legislative oversight of the final regulatory product, the decision mak-
ing process is inherently undemocratic. 
The House of Representatives is elected by the citizens of 
given districts every two years,205 the Senate by citizens of the states 
every six years,206 and the president by the citizens of the nation eve-
 
198 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 223 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
199 Id. 
200 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
201 Id. at 327 
202 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
203 Id. at 319 (explaining that “[a] dependence on the people is, not doubt, the primary 
control on the government”). 
204 Jeffrey E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to Chang-
ing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 292, 319 (explaining that “because of their 
expertise and accountability, agencies are particularly well designed for making various 
kinds of policy decisions”). 
205 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
206 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
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ry four years.207  Furthermore, the Congress is made up of a total of 
535 elected officials, with 435 in the House and 100 in the Senate.208  
Vested with all legislative powers, only those 535 people have the 
constitutionally granted power to make law.209 
The Executive branch includes the President, an elected offi-
cial, and all the federal agencies, which, under the concept of legisla-
tive delegation, have essentially developed the power to legislate.210  
As of 2011, the federal agencies employed approximately 1,372,000 
civilians.211  Furthermore, as the president is only one individual lim-
ited to two terms and elected every four years, as opposed to 435 rep-
resentatives elected every two years, it can be argued that political re-
course is substantially less available.  Such delegation is the epitome 
of an undemocratic practice.  In handing off legislative decisions and 
responsibilities, the Congress allows unelected bureaucrats, who are 
not directly responsible to the citizens, to make decisions that could 
otherwise have disastrous political ramifications for those actually 
elected to make such decisions. 
Although American citizens regularly go to the polls in order 
to elect the 535 individuals who are supposed to make the laws for 
this country, there are instead nearly 1.4 million unelected individuals 
who could potentially legislate as long as Congress delegates to them 
the power to do so in the form of an intelligible principle.212  In his 
concurrence in Whitman, Justice Thomas stated that there are cases in 
which an intelligible principle may be present but “the significance of 
the delegated decision is simply too great for the decision to be called 
anything other than ‘legislative.’ ”213  Justice Thomas further noted 
that since neither of the parties in Whitman examined the Constitution 
in their respective pleadings nor requested that the Court reconsider 
its decisions on delegation of legislative power, the Court was right in 
 
207 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
208 Members of Congress Questions and Answers, THE CENTER ON CONGRESS AT INDIANA 
U., http://congress.indiana.edu/members-congress-questions-and-answers#why100 (last vis-
ited Mar. 4, 2013). 
209 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
210 See cases cited supra note 72.  
211 Executive Branch Civilian Employment Since 1940, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 
MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-
employment-reports/historical-tables/executive-branch-civilian-employment-since-1940/ 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
212 J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
213 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 487. 
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not addressing the issue, although he explained that he would be will-
ing to address whether the Court had strayed from the original inten-
tions of separation of powers at another time.214 
The path of deference that the Court followed in allowing the 
legislature to abdicate a degree of its legislative authority to the exec-
utive agencies is one fraught with danger.  In a government com-
posed of three branches with their own respective roles of writing the 
laws, enforcing the laws, and interpreting the laws, the Court has al-
lowed a perilous relationship to be formed between the writers and 
the enforcers.  Though this is not an instance in which Montesquieu 
would say that the legislature and the executive are “united in the 
same person, or body of magistrates,”215 the delegation allowed by 
the Court through its liberal interpretation of the “intelligible princi-
ple” doctrine does run afoul of Madison’s interpretation of Montes-
quieu’s logic.  According to Madison, “[t]he magistrate in whom the 
whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though 
he can put a negative on every law . . . .”216  Although the American 
political structure does not literally allow the entirety of executive 
power to rest in the President, as it would in a dictator or king, the 
departments and agencies act as extensions of his will.217  The deci-
sions of the departments and agencies are reflections of the goals and 
agenda of each presidential administration, and as such, they essen-
tially provide for the maintenance of “the whole executive power” by 
the president.218 
As such, the time has come to do precisely what Justice 
Thomas mentions in the Whitman case—engage in a frank discussion 
of modern delegation jurisprudence and how far it has strayed from 
the language of the Constitution.  This is not as much an issue of de-
bate regarding the legacy of the Constitution as a “living” or “dead” 
document,219 but rather an issue of genuine concern regarding the le-




215 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
216 Id. at 299-300. 
217 See Shuren, supra note 204, at 295-96. 
218 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 215, at 299; see Shuren, supra note 204, at 195-96. 
219 William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 693 
(1976). 
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B. Superiority of RFRA and the Sherbert Test 
The Sherbert test is a superior test to the Smith test when it 
comes to protecting an individual’s religious freedoms.  Congress 
agreed in 1993 when it enacted RFRA.220  Finding the holding of 
Smith to be far too narrow, Congress codified the Sherbert test, with 
the addition of a least restrictive means test.221  It is evident that 
RFRA was created to address, not only the narrow holding of Smith, 
but also the very disturbing final lines of Justice Scalia’s opinion. 
At the end of his opinion, Scalia recognized that leaving the 
determination of the accommodation of exemption for religious exer-
cise to the political process would likely place less widely practiced 
religions at a disadvantage.222  Scalia found this not only to be an 
“unavoidable consequence of democratic governments,” but also to 
be more desirable than a system in which “each conscience is a law 
unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws 
against the centrality of all religious beliefs.”223  Though she con-
curred in the judgment, Justice O’Connor recognized in her concur-
ring opinion that for the majority opinion to apply as written, the First 
Amendment could only be read to apply in the extreme situations in 
which the State directly targets a particular religious practice.224  This 
result, O’Connor explained, was lacking in precedent and demeaned 
the very notion of the First Amendment’s free exercise protections.225  
Furthermore, Justice O’Connor explained that, in her opinion, the 
very reason the First Amendment was enacted was to protect the reli-
gious freedom and free exercise of religions which were not in the 
majority.226  Scalia’s opinion clearly deems this protection to be bur-
densome on the Court and the legal system.227 
Justice O’Connor’s concerns regarding relegation of religious 
minorities to an inferior position have merit.228  The majority’s ex-
planation that this disadvantage would be but a mere unavoidable 
 
220 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
221 Id. at §§ 2000bb(a)(4), 2000bb-1(b)(2). 
222 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
223 Id. at 890. 
224 Id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
225 Id. at 894-96. 
226 Id. at 902. 
227 Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
228 See supra Section III-B. 
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consequence of democracy is, in particular, why the First Amend-
ment was added to the Bill of Rights.229  The protections encom-
passed in the First Amendment authored by Madison were also sup-
ported by the ideas of Thomas Jefferson, who advocated for the 
abolishment of the old British restrictions still on the books in Virgin-
ia.230  For a modern Court to allow religious minorities to be placed in 
a position of disadvantage flies in the face of what the First Amend-
ment stands for. 
In Smith, the Court held that when a generally applicable, re-
ligion-neutral law burdens particular religious practices, the Govern-
ment does not need to justify the burden with a compelling govern-
mental interest.231  The Court explained that this approach was 
justified in precedent in that the Court had adopted a similar standard 
regarding generally applicable laws.232  With the passage of RFRA, 
Congress made legislators more accountable for legislation that bur-
dened the fundamental right of free exercise.  Over the past century, 
the Court has affirmed time and again that free exercise is indeed a 
fundamental right.233  As a fundamental right, free exercise is guaran-
teed a higher standard of scrutiny than other liberties when determin-
ing whether the liberty has been burdened.234  In instances where mi-
nority groups could be subject to the will of the majority if it were not 
for the protection guaranteed in the Constitution, a test requiring a 
 
229 Id. 
230 See MILLER, supra note 78, at 9 (explaining Jefferson’s list of particular restrictions 
including the capital offense of heresy, the imprisonment of individuals denying the divinity 
of scripture and the existence of the Trinity, as well as denial of certain rights to minority 
religions such as government positions for Catholics or removal of children from Unitarian 
homes as the parents/homes were “declared unfit”). 
231 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3. 
232 Id. (explaining that in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court held that 
“race-neutral laws that have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a particular ra-
cial group do not thereby become subject to compelling-interest analysis under the Equal 
Protection Clause;” and that the Court held that “generally applicable laws unconcerned with 
regulating speech that have the effect of interfering with speech do not thereby become sub-
ject to compelling-interest analysis under the First Amendment,” in Citizen Publ’g Co. v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969)). 
233 See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (“Unquestionably, the free exercise of 
religion is a fundamental constitutional right.”); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (explaining that the Bill of Rights was intended to with-
draw one’s “right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom to wor-
ship and assembly, and other fundamental rights . . . ” from the “vicissitudes of political con-
troversy”). 
234 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a). 
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more searching level of scrutiny is certainly justifiable.235 
Not only has the Court embraced the necessity of a more ex-
acting scrutiny when it comes to alleged violations of the fundamen-
tal right of free exercise, but it has also come to reject the “slippery-
slope” argument for exemptions from generally applicable laws for 
free exercise reasons.236  In O Centro, the Court discussed that the 
Sherbert precedent indicated a rejection of the government’s “slip-
pery-slope” argument as it applied to free exercise.237  Under 
Sherbert, and more recently Cutter v. Wilkinson,238 the Court deter-
mined that case-by-case considerations were feasible when determin-
ing religious exemptions for a generally applicable rule.239 
C. Delegation, 45 CFR 147.130, and the Threat to 
American Liberty 
Under the PPACA, the coverage of women’s preventative 
care and screenings are required by shared cost plans.240  What is 
necessarily covered under this broad topic was to be determined by 
comprehensive guidelines created by the Health Resources and Ser-
vices Administration (“HRSA”).241  The language of the clause is 
clear: Congress granted authority to the HRSA to compile a compre-
hensive set of guidelines that would explain what preventative ser-
vices and screenings were necessary.  Included in these comprehen-
sive guidelines are “contraceptive methods and counseling” which 
include “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive 
methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counsel-
ing for all women with reproductive capacity.”242 
In July 2010, an interim final rule was adopted that would ap-
 
235 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
236 See O Centro, 546 U.S. at 436 (characterizing the slippery-slope argument as “the clas-
sic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you, I’ll have to 
make one for everybody, so no exceptions”). 
237 Id. 
238 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (upholding religious accommodations 
for incarcerated persons under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”)). 
239 O Centro, 546 U.S. at 436. 
240 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
241 Id.  
242 HRSA Guidelines, supra note 22. 
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ply HRSA standards under the PPACA,243 and in August 2011, an 
amendment was presented by the Department of Health and Human 
Services.244  Hoping to “provide for a religious accommodation that 
respects the unique relationship between a house of worship and its 
employees in ministerial positions,” the relevant departments amend-
ed interim final rules to allow the HRSA the discretion to formulate 
an exemption for certain religious employers.245  The HRSA deter-
mined that an employer is exempt if it: (1) has the inculcation of reli-
gious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employs persons who share 
its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons who share its reli-
gious tenets; and (4) is a non-profit organization under section 
6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Code.246  Such 
a definition of the exemption was included in the Final Rule adopted 
on February 15, 2012.247 
i. The Delegation Issue 
The language of the PPACA Section 1001(5) is a delegation 
of legislative duty to the HRSA to alter the language of Public Health 
Service Act Section 2713 (“Section 2713”).  The delegation was for 
the HRSA to create a set of standards that Congress would utilize to 
define preventative care for women under Section 2713.248  Con-
versely, subsections one, two, three, and five of the same section di-
rected that other required preventative health services would be de-
termined and defined by preexisting standards already established by 
the HRSA, the United States Preventative Services Task Force, and 
the Center for Disease Control.249  As such, of the five subsections, 
subsection four was the only one that constituted a delegation of leg-
islative authority. 
It is clear that subsection four is a delegation of legislative au-
thority because of the language used in the Act dictating the use of 
comprehensive guidelines: “[S]upported . . . for purposes of this par-
 
243 See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans, supra note 27. 
244 Group Health Plans II, supra note 30, at 46623. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 46,626. 
247 See Group Health Plans I, supra note 26. 
248 PPACA, supra note 5. 
249 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13. 
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agraph.”250  Whereas Congress defers to previously determined 
guidelines in the other subsections, subsection four authorizes the 
HRSA to determine the guidelines it will choose to apply regarding 
women’s preventative care and screening.251  In dictating what guide-
lines in entirety will apply to other sections and leaving this section to 
the discretion of the executive agency, Congress has effectively dele-
gated its legislative power. 
In order for a delegation to be legitimate, it must be shown 
that Congress, by an act of legislation, has laid down an intelligible 
principle that clearly dictates the general policy, the entity that will 
apply it, and the boundaries of such delegated authority.252  Despite 
the Court’s acknowledgement of its deferential attitude towards Con-
gress’s power to delegate,253 this situation is distinguishable from 
precedent.  In earlier cases, the Court affirmed Congress’s ability to 
use broad language to set standards in legislation.254  In this instance, 
the Court failed to provide any such standard, but instead essentially 
allowed the regulatory entity to set its own standard, which under the 
legislation, will be binding.  This is made clear by separating subsec-
tion 2713(a)(4) into the three factors comprising an intelligible prin-
ciple: (1) the general policy; (2) the entity that will apply the policy; 
and (3) the boundaries of the delegated authority.255 
The intent of the legislation is clear: cost sharing requirements 
shall not be imposed for any additional preventative care and screen-
ings for women that are not described in earlier sections and are pro-
vided for in the new comprehensive guidelines.256  Unlike other cas-
es, however, this is not a delegation of discretion in applying a broad 
 
250 Id. (emphasis added). 
251 Id. 
252 See Am. Power, 329 U.S. at 105; see also J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
253 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta). 
254 See cases cited supra note 72. 
255 See Am. Power, 329 U.S. at 105; see also J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
256 The legislation reads in relevant part: 
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or indi-
vidual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage 
for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirement . . . with respect to 
women, such additional preventative care and screenings not described 
in paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported 
by the Health Resources and Services Administration for purposes of 
this paragraph. 
PPACA, supra note 5. 
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standard, but rather delegation of discretion to determine the stand-
ard.  The general policy of the delegation is to prevent women from 
having to pay for particular preventative care and screenings.  The 
entity responsible for applying this standard is the Department of 
Health and Human Services.257  The boundaries of the delegated au-
thority, however, are not clear.  The legislation explains that the ser-
vices covered are those that are to be found in the “comprehensive 
guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Admin-
istration for purposes of this paragraph.”258  This language means 
that there is no boundary established for the HRSA.  Whereas the 
other subsections in Section 2713 have predetermined standards to 
apply, subsection four not only grants the authority to HRSA to de-
termine new guidelines, but instructs the agency to establish such 
guidelines within the bounds of the very paragraph granting it the au-
thority to create the guidelines—essentially a carte blanche delega-
tion of legislative authority to determine the standards. 
The delegation to the HRSA is “unconfined and vagrant,”259 
as there are no boundaries to limit the promulgation of whatever 
standards the HRSA determines to be fitting without approval from 
Congress.260  In Schechter, the Court found that a section of the 
NIRA allowing the President to “approve a code or codes”261 was ul-
timately too unrestrictive and unconfined.262  As in the instant case, 
which thus is distinguishable from Whitman and Mistretta, the Court 
in Schechter struck down legislation that “[i]nstead of prescribing 
rules of conduct . . . authorize[d] the making of codes to prescribe 
them.”263 
When an agency is granted the task, in legislation, to create 
and provide the guidelines for enforcing the very same legislation 
granting the agency legislative discretion, there should be a clear in-
dication of the bounds of such power.  Even if the delegation was de-
termined to be one of discretion and not legislative authority, it is 
 
257 The Health Resources and Services Administration is an agency of the Department of 
Health and Human Services.  See About HRSA, HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMIN., 
http://www.hrsa.gov/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
258 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (emphasis added). 
259 See Schecter, 295 U.S. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (referencing Hot Oil). 
260 Id.   
261 Id. at 521 n.4 (majority opinion). 
262 Id. at 541-42. 
263 Id. at 541. 
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problematic when the agency wields discretion to implement and en-
force the very guidelines it was granted discretion to create.  As such, 
there has not only been a lack of guidance and boundaries from Con-
gress regarding the creation of guidelines, but there is a total absence 
of guidance from Congress on the appropriate application of such 
guidelines. 
This lack of guidance and total delegation of authority is 
made evident by the frequent proliferation of amendments to the 
code.264  Furthermore, there is little evidence to suggest that after 
hearing comments regarding February 2013’s proposed alterations, 
the Department of Health and Human Services will decide not to im-
plement the expanded exemption and accommodation for other eligi-
ble non-exempt, non-profit organizations.  Truthfully, this is an ar-
gument belying great skepticism; however, there is substantial 
evidence in the previous interim rule and final rule papers that sug-
gests that the Department of Health and Human Services has greatly 
downplayed the disapproval of the rule commenters.265  In each of the 
papers, the author spends nearly equal space discussing the argu-
ments for and against the proposals,266 yet has clearly had to retreat 
from its initial strict application of the rule.267 
Assuming arguendo that the Court is to find an intelligible 
principle and uphold the delegation on the basis of precedent, the 
next issue is whether the language of Title 45, Section 147.130 is 
within the boundary set by Congress in the legislation.268  If the Court 
does indeed find an intelligible principle and deems the delegation 
legitimate, it will likely find that the religious exemption is also with-
in the boundary set by the legislation.  In allowing such a broad dele-
gation of legislative authority to conduct fact finding and determine 
 
264 See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans, supra note 27 (introducing the preven-
tative care language for 45 C.F.R. 247.130); see Group Health Plans II, supra note 30 (intro-
ducing the religious employer exemption); see Group Health Plans I, supra note 26 (adopt-
ing the religious employer exemption and providing the temporary enforcement “safe 
harbor”); see Coverage of Certain Preventable Services, supra note 25 (introducing proposal 
of creating 45 CFR 247.131 to replace 45 C.F.R. 147.130(a)(1)(iv), as well as expand the 
exemption and establish accommodations for other eligible organizations such as religious 
schools, colleges, and universities with religious based objections to coverage of contracep-
tive services). 
265 See Group Health Plans II, supra note 30, at 46, 623. 
266 See Group Health Plans II, supra note 30; see Group Health Plans I, supra note 26. 
267 See Coverage of Certain Preventable Services, supra note 25. 
268 See Am. Power, 329 U.S. at 105; see also J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
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what should be included in comprehensive guidelines concerning 
preventative care and screening for women, it would be unlikely for 
the Court to find any policy resulting from the application of the 
agency’s guidelines to be outside the scope of the delegation. 
If the Court adheres to its precedent of deference to  Con-
gress’s delegation of power to Executive agencies, despite the distin-
guishable nature of this case, it will likely find that the language of 
PPACA Section 1001(5) is a legitimate delegation, and will thus up-
hold the constitutionality of the narrow religious exemption language.  
In holding so, the Court would therefore reject the Nondelegation 
Doctrine that this Comment champions and instead opt to accept the 
more modern and deferential delegation position. 
ii. The Free Exercise Issue 
The Supreme Court may find that the legislation and resulting 
Federal Code could survive judicial scrutiny under a nondelegation 
claim.  However, the real issue debated in the lower courts today is 
whether the contraceptive mandate should be upheld, regardless of 
whether it is a product of improper delegation.269  The difficulty in 
addressing the constitutional validity of the regulation is that most of 
the decisions handed down by the courts have been rulings on proce-
dure, such as ripeness and standing.270  Currently there is a split 
among the Circuits regarding the appropriateness of injunctive relief 
on the merits.271  The split is further exacerbated by the lack of a 
 
269 As of the writing of this Comment, there are forty-eight cases before District and Cir-
cuit Courts across the United States.  HHS Mandate Information Central, THE BECKET FUND 
FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Feb. 
28, 2013). 
270 See id.  Most of the difficulty surrounding these lawsuits is the result of the agency’s 
ability to publish final rules and then proceed to further amend the final rules.  Some courts 
have held off on handing down final decisions in order to see the further actions of the agen-
cies. 
271 As it currently stands, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have both issued injunctions in 
favor of the plaintiff.  O’Brien v. US Dep’t of HHS, No. 12-3357 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012), 
available at http://c0391070.cdn2.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/pdf/8th-circuit-order-
granting-temporary-injunction-in-obrien-v-hhs.pdf; Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 
WL 6757353 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012); Grote v. Sebelius, No. 13-1077, 2013 WL 362725 
(7th Cir. Jan. 30, 2013); Annex Medical v. Sebelius, No. 13-118 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013), 
available at http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/8thCircuitAnnex.pdf.  
The Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have conversely denied injunctive relief.  Hobby Lob-
by, Inc., v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012), reh’g en 
banc granted, (10th Cir. Mar. 29, 2013); Autocam Corp., v. Sebelius, No. 12-2673 (6th Cir. 
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unanimous decision of the Circuit Judges, with the exception of one 
case in the Eighth Circuit and one case in the Tenth Circuit.272  Not 
only do the Circuit splits seem to destine the issue to reach the Su-
preme Court, but the Court itself also illustrated an interest in hearing 
the case when it ordered the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to re-
hear some arguments after a premature dismissal following National 
Federal of Independent Business v. Sebelius.273 
RFRA provides that in order for a law burdening an individu-
al’s right to free exercise to be deemed constitutional, the federal 
government must demonstrate that the burden acts to further a com-
pelling governmental interest and that such a burden is the least re-
strictive means of furthering the asserted governmental interest.274  
Accordingly, looking at the arguments presented by both parties in 
the cases that have reached the Circuit Courts, the explanations of the 
government’s compelling interest and the plaintiffs’ burdens should 
become clear.275 
In rebutting a free exercise claim under RFRA, the Govern-
ment must demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in im-
plementing the contraceptive coverage mandate.  Of particular con-
cern, the government will have to illustrate the compelling 
governmental interest in the mandatory coverage of contraceptive 
services without imposition of cost sharing requirements by all non-
exempt276 group health plans or group/individual health insurance 
 
Dec. 28, 2012), available at http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/order-
denying-injunctionAutocam-CA6.pdf; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., v. Sect’y of the 
US Dep’t of HHS, No. 13-1144 (3d Cir. Jan. 29, 2013), available at 
http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Conestoga-CTA-Order-Denying-
Injunction.pdf. 
272 See generally Annex Medical, No. 13-118; Hobby Lobby, 2012 WL 6930302. 
273 See SCOTUS Orders Appeals Court to Hear Liberty University Health Care Lawsuit, 
POLITICO.COM, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/84226.html (last updated Nov. 
27, 2012).  See also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
274 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
275 This Comment will regard these cases strictly for the arguments presented when the 
courts determined whether the plaintiff’s arguments possessed any merit.  See Korte, 2012 
WL 6757353, at *2 (requiring “some likelihood of success on the merits”); Hobby Lobby, 
2012 WL 6930302, at *1 (requiring “substantial likelihood of success on the merits”); 
Autocam, No. 12-2673, at 1 (requiring a strong likelihood of success on the merits”); Cones-
toga, No. 13-1144, at 2 (requiring “a likelihood of success on the merits”).  This note serves 
as recognition that all of the Circuit Court decisions discussed were appeals for injunctive 
relief and thus are not necessarily indicative of how the courts would rule on the merits. 
276 Assuming that 78 FR 8456 has effectively removed religiously affiliated organizations 
from the mandate, the RFRA discussion will proceed focusing upon the burden on the reli-
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coverage plans.277  Several executive offices and associated individu-
als have argued that the compelling governmental interest is in pro-
moting public health, ensuring access to the recommended preventa-
tive services, and ensuring that the decision whether to use 
contraception and in what form is a decision for the woman to make, 
rather than the employer.278 
This argument is supported by the data upon which the HRSA 
relied when making the guidelines, most notably the study on preven-
tative services for women published by the Institute of Medicine’s 
Committee on Preventative Services for Women.279  In that study, the 
Committee made the recommendation that women’s preventative 
services include “the full range of Food and Drug Administration-
approved contraception methods, sterilization procedures, and patient 
education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity.”280  
This recommendation was used by the HRSA in its comprehensive 
guideline for “contraceptive methods and counseling.”281  Moreover, 
the study put forth several arguments to support the inclusion of con-
traception under the umbrella of women’s preventative care, includ-
ing a decrease in unintended pregnancies and the treatment of “men-
strual disorders, acne, hirsutism, and pelvic pain.”282  The study’s 
primary focus was on the unintended pregnancies, the costs of such 
pregnancies, and the effect on the mothers.283  Furthermore, the study 
found that the most effective and long lasting contraceptive methods 
are typically out of the reach of women due to high costs284 or their 
 
gious rights of the remaining for-profit organizations with religious objections to the man-
date. 
277 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130. 
278 See Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *4; see also Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay 
Carney, 1/31/12, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/01/31/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-13112).  Since the promotion of 
public health is such a broad interest, and the contraceptive mandate has a particular focus on 
ensuring and increasing the availability of contraceptive services, the accepted compelling 
governmental interest for the sake of this comment is primarily on the interest of ensuring 
and increasing availability of contraceptive services for women. 
279 CLINICAL PREVENTATIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS (Committee on 
Preventative Services for Women, Inst. of Med., 2011) [hereinafter CLINICAL PREVENTATIVE 
SERVICES]. 
280 Id. at 110. 
281 HRSA Guidelines, supra note 22. 
282 CLINICAL PREVENTATIVE SERVICES, supra note 279, at 104, 107. 
283 Id. at 102-04. 
284 Id. at 108. 
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socio-economic background.285 
While the Government may have a legitimate compelling in-
terest in ensuring and increasing women’s access to contraceptive 
services, it is not entirely clear that the Government has sufficiently 
supported this interest.  Directly following the Federal Code provi-
sion dictating the necessary coverage of contraceptive services is a 
section dealing with determination of the “preservation of right to 
maintain existing coverage.”286  This section of the code sets forth 
standards dealing with grandfathered health plan coverage, which the 
text defines as “coverage provided by a group health plan, or individ-
ual health insurance issuer, in which an individual was enrolled on 
March 23, 2010 (for as long as it maintains that status under the rules 
of this section).”287  The regulation exempts any such grandfathered 
coverage from the application of Title I(A) or Title I(C) of the 
PPACA.288  Interestingly enough, Title I(A) of the PPACA includes 
Section 1001 of the bill, which provides for the modification and al-
teration of Section 2713 of the Public Health Service Act dealing 
with preventative services.289 
A legitimate argument can be made that by establishing such 
a sweeping initial exemption, the Government cannot legitimately 
claim that it has a compelling governmental interest in ensuring and 
increasing women’s access to contraceptive services or that the man-
date furthers such an interest.  Not only does Section 147.140 allow 
grandfathered plans to avoid having to cover contraceptive services, 
but it also allows plans that already cover contraceptive services to 
maintain a co-pay for services and even increase “fixed-amount co-
payments,” provided the increase is less than “$5 times medical infla-
tion, plus $5”290 or a maximum percentage increase “determined by 
expressing the total increase in the copayment as a percentage.”291  
The legitimacy of the Government’s argument that the purpose of the 
contraception mandate is to ensure women’s ready and affordable ac-
cess to contraception is clearly eroded by the other language promul-
 
285 Id. at 102. 
286 45 C.F.R. § 147.140 (2011). 
287 Id. at § 147.140(a)(1)(i). 
288 Id. at § 147.140(c)(1). 
289 See Pub. L. No. 111-148, Title I. 
290 45 C.F.R. §147.140(g)(1)(iv)(A). 
291 Id. at §147.150(g)(1)(iv)(B). 
39
Barone, Jr.: The Destruction of American Liberties
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
834 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
gated by the very same corpus of regulation.292 
Assuming arguendo that the Court does indeed find the Gov-
ernment’s proposed governmental interest compelling and that the 
mandate furthers such an interest, the next issue would be whether 
the regulation is the least restrictive means of ensuring and increasing 
women’s access to contraceptive services.  The strongest argument 
the Government might present is that because the corporation pays 
for the health coverage, there is no dirtying of the hands or commis-
sion of sin by the corporate owners.293  As such, the Government will 
most likely appeal to earlier decisions that it will claim deny corpora-
tions the right to sue under the RFRA because “ ‘the “historic func-
tion” of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of 
individuals.’ ”294  Accordingly, the Government might argue, and has 
argued, that the mandate is the least restrictive means of ensuring and 
increasing women’s access to contraceptive services because the bur-
dened entities cannot assert such a deprivation of rights under the 
First Amendment.  This is due to the fact that free exercise is a purely 
personal right.295 
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,296 the Court de-
clined to “address the abstract question whether corporations have the 
full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amend-
ment.”297  As such, the Government’s assertion that corporations can-
not claim the benefits of a “purely personal” protection is not as iron-
clad as the district court in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius 
(“Hobby Lobby I”)298 would make it out to be.299  Regardless of this, 
several district courts and some circuit courts, including the Tenth 
 
292 This conclusion equally applies to the unaddressed compelling governmental interest 
regarding the promotion of public health.  To exempt a broad range of programs from appli-
cation from the very beginning does nothing to further promote public health. 
293 See Hobby Lobby, 2012 WL 6930302, at *3 (explaining that “[s]uch an indirect and 
attenuated relationship appears unlikely to establish the necessary ‘substantial burden’ ”); 
see also Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *5 (Rovener, J., dissenting) (explaining that the corpo-
rate form “does separate the Kortes, in some real measure, from the actions of their compa-
ny”). 
294 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., v. Sebelius (Hobby Lobby I), 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1287-
88 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 
(1978) (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-701 (1944))). 
295 Id. at 1287. 
296 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
297 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777. 
298 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012). 
299 See id. at 1288. 
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Circuit in Hobby Lobby I, have recognized a growing trend of courts 
enforcing RFRA to protect the individual rights of plaintiffs to partic-
ipate or abstain from specific practices required or prohibited by their 
religion.300  Several courts dealing with requests for injunctive relief 
on this particular issue have allowed the corporate owners as individ-
ual plaintiffs to have standing under RFRA.301  In one case in particu-
lar, the court highlighted the plaintiffs’ argument that “ ‘[t]here is no 
business or corporation “exception” ‘ to RFRA or the Free Exercise 
Clause, and that these provisions protect the religious exercise of any 
entity . . . .”302 
Further arguments can be made in opposition to the Govern-
ment’s claim that there is no burden on the individual business owner 
because of the indirect nature of the purchase of coverage.  In par-
ticular, the Government’s argument fails to consider the nature of 
corporate governance.  The dissenting judge in Conestoga presented 
the plaintiffs’ dilemma as: “[M]ake us pay for something poisonous 
to our religious beliefs or face the destruction of our business.”303  
Does the corporate structure cause such a separation between the acts 
of the corporation and the owners that the government can impose 
such a choice upon the owners, but at the same time allow for the 
piercing of the corporate veil for corporate debts?  This argument al-
so raises the question whether partnerships or other business entities 
are left uncovered under RFRA.  Additional concerns must be ad-
dressed regarding how well the mandate ensures and increases public 
health or women’s access to contraceptive services for companies 
with less than fifty employees.304  If an employer with fewer than fif-
ty employees chooses to help provide health insurance for his or her 
employees, but finds the mandatory coverage of contraceptive ser-
vices morally repugnant, he or she may instead decide not to provide 
insurance for the employees, as was the case in Annex Medical Inc., 
 
300 See Hobby Lobby, 2012 WL 6930302, at *3. 
301 See Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3; see Annex Med. Inc., v. Sebelius, No. 13-118; 
see Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-1635(RBW), 2012 WL 5817323, at 
*5-*9 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2012). 
302 Tyndale, 2012 WL 5817323, at *5. 
303 Conestoga, No. 13-1144, at 12 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
304 See 26 U.S.C. § 4980(H) (2006) (establishing minimum requirements of employer-
sponsored plans for “large employers”); see also 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (defining 
“large corporations” as employing fifty or more individuals). 
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et al. v. Sebelius, et al.305  In situations dealing with small business, it 
is difficult to see how the compelling interest proffered by the gov-
ernment is furthered.  Even greater constitutional issues arise due to 
the exemption of some corporations and not others, which creates an 
equal protection classification scheme that raises additional issues 
beyond the scope of this Comment. 
Despite the Government’s assertion that the contraception 
mandate in its current form is the least restrictive means of furthering 
its compelling governmental interest, there are several alternative 
methods through which the same goal could be achieved.  According 
to one author who found the religious exemption of Title 45, Section 
142.130 to be constitutional under RFRA, “[t]he least restrictive 
means requirement must . . . mean that the Act could have gone fur-
ther to protect the specific free exercise interests claimed by those 
challenging the Act.”306  The author established this meaning after 
stating that an Act cannot fail under RFRA simply for not including 
each and every exemption the plaintiff could think of.307  While this 
is true, it does not change the fact that in crafting the contraception 
mandate, Congress and the executive agencies could have chosen a 
series of alternatives to achieve the same goals. 
In Korte, et al. v. Sebelius, et al.,308 the Seventh Circuit dis-
cussed, albeit very briefly, one such alternative posed by the plaintiffs 
illustrating that the contraceptive mandate as it is written is not the 
least restrictive means.  Although it is only a quick aside, the court 
took notice of the plaintiff’s proposal that the government offer tax 
deductions or credits for the purchase of plans covering contracep-
tion.309  Such a concept has tremendous potential to encourage corpo-
rations and individual employers, which would otherwise not fall un-
der the religious exemption, to purchase insurance plans with 
contraception services.  Furthermore, this option would allow corpo-
rations and employers to retain autonomy in making decisions 
whether to cover the cost of employee health care. 
In addition, a number of state programs could include the 
 
305 Annex Med. Inc., No. 13-118, at 3. 
306 Samuel T. Grover, Religious Exemptions to the PPACA’s Health Insurance Mandate, 
37 AM. J. L. & MED. 624, 644 (2011). 
307 Grover, supra note 306, at 644. 
308 Korte, 2012 WL 6757353. 
309 Id. at *3. 
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mandated coverage instead of all private insurance programs.  Under 
services such as Medicaid, COBRA, and other state run health cover-
age programs,310 a rider could be offered that would extend coverage 
of contraceptive services or could create new programs altogether.  
Such programs would likely be funded by general taxes, and any reli-
giously objecting plaintiff would have a difficult time establishing a 
sufficient claim against such taxes because of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Lee.311  In Lee, the Court held that if reli-
gious denominations were allowed to challenge a general tax, such as 
income tax or the tax enacted by the Social Security Act, premised 
solely on the assumption that the taxes may be spent in a manner vio-
lative of that sect’s beliefs, the tax system could not function.312 
Lastly, an alternative to the mandate could have been a tax 
deduction for all women working under employers who found the 
purchasing of coverage including contraceptive services to be contra-
ry to their religious beliefs.  One of the concerns arising out of the re-
port from the Institute of Medicine was the cost of contraceptive ser-
vices, especially among certain demographics.313  In providing these 
deductions, the government would relieve the burden placed on the 
rights of religious employers as well as the financial hardship placed 
on the women employees. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
At the end of Federalist 48, Madison noted with concern that 
“a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the 
several departments is not a sufficient guard against those encroach-
ments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of 
government in the same hands.”314  Justice Thomas raised this very 
same concern in Whitman when he observed that the plaintiffs had 
failed to raise the argument most obviously available to them—the 
granting of all legislative power to Congress in Article I, Section 1 of 
 
310 Approximately half the states in the Union already operate Medicaid-founded pro-
grams focusing on family planning and contraceptive services.  CLINICAL PREVENTATIVE 
SERVICES, supra note 279, at 108. 
311 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
312 Id. at 260. 
313 CLINICAL PREVENTATIVE SERVICES, supra note 279, at 108. 
314 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 310 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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the Constitution.315 
The constant delegation of discretion and the more disturbing 
delegation of legislative authority from the legislature to the execu-
tive is something that should be carefully noted and skeptically ob-
served by all citizens of the United States.  It has become clear that 
the Supreme Court is hesitant to declare such delegations unconstitu-
tional or unlawfully broad,316 just as the Court has also come to deem 
the oppression of religious minorities to be an “unavoidable conse-
quence of democratic governments.”317 
Results of recent legislation such as the contraceptive services 
coverage mandate arising out of the PPACA have finally awakened a 
sleeping public to the grave threat that such delegation poses to 
American liberties.  To combat this threat, a plaintiff should 
acknowledge the wisdom of Justice Thomas and invoke Article I, 
Section 1 of the Constitution as one of several very strong arguments 
against this abuse. 
 
 
315 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives”). 
316 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75. 
317 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
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